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Abstract
In this article, the authors discuss the three most important strategic framing choices 
by political actors (“substantive emphasis choice,” “oppositional emphasis choice,” and 
“contest emphasis choice”) of direct-democratic campaigns. The authors investigate 
these strategic framing choices in the media input and look at how the political actors 
change their choices in another communication channel (political advertisement) 
and over time. The results provide the following insights: First, political actors tend 
to emphasize one to two main frames in their media input. They generally also use 
their main frames in the political advertisements and stay on their main frames over 
time. Second, although political actors tend to emphasize their own frames, they do 
not exclusively revert to this behavior. The authors find that the political actors pay 
more attention to their opponents’ frames in the media input than in the ads. With 
regard to variation over time, the authors can state that campaign dialogue does not 
disappear over the course of the campaign. Third, framing is primarily accomplished 
in substantive terms. In the advertisements and toward the end of the campaign, the 
authors do not find more contest frames.
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To win a political campaign, political actors try to achieve an emphasis effect (Druckman, 
2001, 2004), that is, to lead the media or individuals to focus on certain aspects of an issue 
instead of others when constructing their opinions (Druckman, 2001, p. 230). They frame 
the issue at stake strategically and “campaign on behalf of competing ways of understanding 
          
   
what is at issue” (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, p. 158). In this article, we look at two sets 
of processes that are part of frame building—frame construction and frame promotion—and 
the strategic choices involved in these processes. In the construction process of frame build-
ing, we argue that political actors face at least three strategic emphasis choices (Hänggli & 
Kriesi, 2010) while they choose the communication channels and decide about variation of 
the choices over time in the promotion process of frame building (Hänggli, 2010).
The article is structured according to the choices. We start by discussing the con-
struction and promotion processes for each framing choice. In the second part, we pres-
ent the empirical analysis structured according to the choices. We distinguish between 
mediated channels (media input, e.g., press releases) and unmediated channels (politi-
cal advertisements). In mediated channels, campaigners must cater to the needs and 
values of journalists. Unmediated channels offer campaigners control over the content 
and form of the message. Both mediated and unmediated channels target the general 
public. The comparison between the two channels is worth studying for at least two 
reasons. First of all, since campaigners must satisfy journalists, news values may deter-
mine their framing strategies in the media input, but not in the advertisements. By com-
paring the actors’ media input with their political advertisements, we can assess their 
true framing intentions. Second, a successful strategic communication depends on coor-
dinating messages across all publications (Norris, Curtice, Sanders, Scammell, & 
Semetko, 1999, p. 67). Therefore, in spite of some variation across channels, there 
should also be some framing similarity between them. To our knowledge, the way in 
which political actors rely on the same message across different channels in direct-
democratic campaigns has never been investigated.
Substantive Emphasis Choice
First, to win a campaign, the strategic actors are expected to search for a frame that 
they believe has the capacity to become a strong substantive frame. We call this choice 
the “substantive emphasis choice.” They might also provide a second or third main 
frame, to which they can switch if their most important frame (core frame) is not 
resonating well. At the same time, actors do not want to overload the processing 
capacity of the media (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 104) and might not promote too 
many frames. The number of frames with which they will ultimately campaign is an 
empirical question.
A strong frame is a frame that provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/
or that resonates in the media (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010). This conceptualization of 
strength is based on Koopmans’s idea that resonant messages (i.e., messages that pro-
voke reactions) travel further (Koopmans, 2004, p. 374). It means that a frame dis-
cussed by the opponent is a strong frame. In Chong and Druckman’s (2007a) 
experiments, the relative strength of a frame turned out to be the most important dimen-
sion of influence, under both one-sided and competitive conditions. However, the study 
was concerned with the effects of frames on voters and not on the media.
          
     
We expect political actors focus on their core frame in their advertisements for 
three reasons: First of all, if advertising provides candidates with much greater con-
trol over their message than does news coverage, it is a less credible source than the 
news media (Iyengar & McGrady, 2007). Thus, in ads, political actors have an incen-
tive to use their most credible message, that is, their core frame. Second, advertising 
allows campaigners to tailor their message to the specific target of those voters who 
are pivotal to the outcome of a vote. In other words, in ads, campaigners use the 
frame they think will most effectively mobilize swing voters. Third, an advertisement 
focusing on a given frame can be used to seize the attention of the news media 
(Iyengar & McGrady, 2007).
Do the political actors vary their substantive emphasis choice over time? 
Campaigners should not waffle or flip-flop between the frames (Iyengar & McGrady, 
2007). Rather, campaigners should stay on message (Norris et al., 1999; Perron, 
2007) or on their core frame, which they chose according to the substantive emphasis 
choice. Staying on message means the capacity to repeat the central campaign mes-
sage, even when challenged by journalists, the opponents, or simply the campaign 
environment. This promotion practice goes hand in hand with the well-known advice 
put forward by issue-ownership theory (Petrocik, 1996), which states that political 
actors should focus on the issue or issue attribute for which they enjoy an advantage. 
Of course, if a message is failing, it might be better to jettison plans and adapt to the 
circumstances. Nevertheless, strategic communication is based on the principle of 
planning for all eventualities and developing a popular message well in advance of 
the crucial phase of the campaign. Thus, we expect the campaigners to stay on their 
core frames in both channels.
Oppositional Emphasis Choice
Second, the political actors have to decide how much importance they attach to the 
frames of the opponents compared to their own frames. This choice is labeled the 
“oppositional emphasis choice.” According to well-known advice, political actors 
should focus on the issue or issue attributes where they enjoy an advantage. Riker’s 
(1996) “dominance principle” formulates this type of strategy: “When one side has 
an advantage on an issue, the other side ignores it.” Issue-ownership theory (Petrocik, 
1996) suggests that political parties tend to follow this recipe, which means that they 
essentially talk past each other in political campaigns. As a consequence, yes and no 
campaigners fighting against each other are expected to essentially rely on different 
frames. However, actors may have an incentive to address the opponents’ frames as 
well. We expect political actors to prefer their own substantive frames and to refer 
to their opponents’ frames only to the extent that their opponents’ framing is suc-
cessful or that they anticipate it to be successful. Campaign dialogue (Kaplan, Park, 
& Ridout, 2006) investigates how far the two camps converge on the main frames of 
a campaign.
          
   
With regard to the variation of the oppositional emphasis choice in the communica-
tion channels, campaigners are expected to use fewer opponents’ frames in their politi-
cal advertisements than they use in media input. Thus, it is expected that campaigners 
will engage in less campaign dialogue with regard to ads than they will with regard to 
the media input. In their political advertisements, campaigners follow issue ownership 
theory and emphasize issues on which they enjoy an advantage over their opponent 
(Iyengar & McGrady, 2007). This also appears to be plausible for frames. Normally, 
ads in newspapers or flyers are small (half a newspaper page), decreasing the chance of 
a dialogue. They often include no more than a short, catchy message, and thus do not 
lend themselves to extensive debate. Consequently, campaigners are expected to not be 
interested in their opponents’ frames.
How do the campaigners vary the level of campaign dialogue (oppositional empha-
sis choice) over time? In real-world debates, framing strategies such as alternate frames 
(promotion of one’s own frames) and direct rebuttals (counterframes; Jerit, 2009) are 
common. Gilland and Marquis (2006) document that in contrast to Riker’s so-called 
“dominance principle,” there is no concentration on a smaller number of frames over 
the course of a direct-democratic campaign. Koopmans (2004, p. 389) supports this 
notion, stating that he does not expect a “long-term tendency towards an increasingly 
uniform public discourse. . . . [P]ublic discourse is kept alive by the small minority of 
‘distortions’ or ‘mutations.’” Based on Gilland and Marquis’s findings, we also expect 
there to be no concentration on a smaller number of frames toward the end of the campaign 
in the media input, or in the media coverage. In the political advertisements, we expect to 
find less campaign dialogue in general, but we do not have a specific hypothesis about 
variation over time here.
Contest Emphasis Choice
Concerning the third choice, the political actors have to decide how much importance 
they attach to the campaign contest compared to the substantive content of the cam-
paign. This is the “contest emphasis choice.” In this respect, we distinguish between 
two types of frames—contest frames and substantive frames.1 The unique feature of the 
contest frames is that they do not address the issue(s) at stake, but focus on the actors 
involved or on the contest per se—on politics—whereas substantive frames focus on 
the substantive contents of the debate—on policy. In general, we expect that the politi-
cal actors would like to get their substantive message across and place a high priority 
on their chosen substantive frame(s). Direct-democratic votes are issue specific, which 
implies a certain substantive focus.
Extreme actors are likely to use more contest frames because they are likely to pur-
sue other goals goal than simply influencing the outcome of the vote on the issue at 
stake or of the next elections. Extreme actors often do not have sufficient power to win 
a direct-democratic campaign or an election and must have other reasons for their 
participation. Most importantly, they are likely to aim at mobilizing their grassroots. 
Harmel and Janda (1994, p. 275) called this goal the “intraparty democracy” goal. We 
          
     
prefer to call it the “grassroots participation” goal. Organizations that pursue this 
grassroots participation goal seek to keep up the activities after a direct-democratic 
campaign. This constitutes an aim in itself. A direct-democratic campaign can help to 
reach this goal by strengthening the group identity. One way to strengthen this identity 
is to distinguish between in-group and out-group and to denounce the others or point 
out the conflicts. Thus, the extreme actors are expected to use more contest frames. In 
addition, members of extreme organizations are found to use a different style of politi-
cal engagement (McClosky & Chong, 1985). They are more likely to attribute per-
sonal failings to those who are far from their own political ideals. In other words, they 
are again expected to use more contest frames.
With regard to political ads, we expect that newspaper editors, who depend on 
advertising revenue, will refuse to print advertisements that are too aggressive to 
avoid alienating potential advertisers. Nevertheless, contest frames, that is, personal 
attacks and criticism, are still possible. It is well known that in the United States cam-
paigners rely heavily on negative or attack advertisements (Iyengar & McGrady, 
2007, pp. 147-149). Typically, consultants differentiate between critiques on perfor-
mance, which focus on opponents’ records, and character assassinations, in which 
opponents are portrayed as immoral people. As a result of several factors, however, 
both tactics appear to be insignificant in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. First, the 
opponent’s character is not at stake. Second, the Swiss consensus democracy is based 
on power sharing, which handicaps clear responsibilities and performance critiques. 
Third, Swiss political culture has traditionally been less confrontational. As such, we 
expect political actors to use arguments in their advertisements instead of contest 
frames, such as attacks.
How do the campaigners vary the contest emphasis choice over time? Campaigners 
of ad hoc committees believe that they have more influence on the frame-building 
process before the “crucial phase” starts. Based on their experience with the media, the 
campaigners presume that scarcity in terms of media attention increases during the 
“crucial phase” when more actors are involved. To compensate this increasingly scarce 
media attention, the political actors may increase the news value of their events 
(Schulz, 1997) by becoming more aggressive or increasing the conflict in their media 
input toward the end of a campaign. This means that they vary their contest emphasis 
choice by increasing their contest frames in the media input toward the end. The news 
media might then follow suit. By contrast, we do not expect a variation in the use of 
contest frames for the political advertisements.
To sum up our hypotheses, first, the strategic actors are expected to search for a 
frame that they believe has the capacity to become a strong substantive frame (substan-
tive emphasis choice). We expect political actors to increase the use of their core frame 
in their advertisements and to stay on frames over the course of the campaign. Second, 
pro and contra campaigners fighting against each other are expected to essentially rely 
on different frames. If the political actors refer to the frames of their opponents, they are 
expected to do so defensively insofar as their opponents’ framing is successful or they 
anticipate their opponents’ framing to be successful (oppositional emphasis choice). 
          
   
Campaigners are expected to use fewer opponents’ frames in their political advertise-
ments than in their media input. We also expect there to be no concentration on a small 
number of frames toward the end of the campaign. Third, we expect that the political 
actors put a high priority on their chosen substantive frame(s) (contest emphasis choice). 
The extreme political actors might use more contest frames. We expect political actors 
to focus on substantive arguments in their advertisements. With regard to variation over 
time, political actors possibly increase their contest frames in the media input toward 
the end but do not vary the use of contest frames for the political advertisements.
Context of the Study
This article studies frame construction and promotion in the context of a political 
campaign dealing with the issue of immigration in Switzerland: The initiative “for 
democratic naturalizations” was launched by the conservative Swiss people’s party 
(SVP) and submitted to the voters on June 1, 2008. It was voted down by 63.6% of the 
voters. The clarity of this verdict came as a big surprise and constituted a conspicuous 
defeat for the SVP, for which this vote had been the most important test of its new 
opposition politics. The party had won the federal elections in fall 2007, but it had lost 
the fight for the composition of the governmental coalition in December 2007: Its 
coalition partners had respected its claim for two out of the total of seven governmen-
tal seats, but they had not complied with the party’s demand to reelect both of its 
incumbent ministers. Instead of the party’s charismatic leader Christoph Blocher—the 
incumbent minister of justice, Parliament had chosen another member of the party—
Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf—to replace him. It was essentially a coalition of Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats that had unseated the SVP leader. As a reaction to 
the ousting of its leader, the SVP proceeded to exclude its two newly elected ministers 
from the party and decided to adopt a systematic oppositional stance. The exclusion 
procedure preoccupied the SVP and the Swiss public right up to the vote on the natu-
ralization initiative, which explains why the campaign for the initiative began rather 
late, just 5 weeks before the vote. This vote provided the first important test for the 
party’s new overall strategy.
The initiative proposed that the voters in a given municipality should be able to 
decide which kind of procedure they wanted for naturalizations—in particular whether 
they wanted to vote at the ballot box on individual naturalizations. Moreover, the initia-
tive stipulated that it should not be possible to appeal against local rejections of natural-
ization requests. The initiative, in fact, demanded that the act of naturalization become 
an exclusively political act of the citizens as sovereign.
The government rejected the initiative, arguing above all that it violated interna-
tional law, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Pact II, 
and the UN Convention Against Racism. The debate in Parliament on the initiative 
was rather controversial, since several members of the moderate right felt a good deal 
of sympathy for the proposal. Eventually, Parliament decided by a clear majority to 
reject the initiative. The parliamentary and the direct-democratic debate slightly 
          
     
varied. In Parliament, they were mainly concerned about the procedure they wanted 
for naturalization. As revealed by an extensive analysis of parliamentary documents, 
the pro camp asked for fair procedures that complied with basic rights (rule of law), 
whereas the pro side conceived naturalizations as political acts and not as administra-
tive ones and claimed that people should have the final say (people final say). In the 
direct-democratic phase, the pro camp also argued that “mass naturalizations” had to 
be stopped. These were the three main frames suggested by political actors (for these 
frames, see Gerth & Siegert, 2012; Hänggli, 2012; Matthes, 2012; Schemer, Wirth, & 
Matthes, 2012; Wettstein, 2012).
Method
Coding of Campaign Material
We rely on a content analysis of all the campaign material produced by the political 
actors for communication with the media—input for earned media coverage (“media 
input”: press releases, speeches from media conferences or public statements)—as 
well as on the content analysis of the political advertisements (“political ads”). This 
material was coded with the same codebook on a daily basis for the 3 months prior to 
the vote. Frames constitute our unit of analysis. We operationalize substantive frames 
with the arguments that the two camps have produced to support their own position 
or to undermine the position of their adversaries. Frames and arguments are not 
entirely the same. Framing is the process by which political actors define the issue for 
their audience (e.g., Matthes, 2009; Nelson et al., 1997a, 1997b). A frame highlights 
some aspects of a perceived reality and enhances a certain interpretation or evaluation 
of reality (Entman, 1993). In this respect, a frame is more than an argument because 
it also provides a specific understanding of the world. We use the term frame when 
referring to this broader sense of the term. By contrast, we rely on the term argument 
when we are concerned with the specific justifications provided in the course of the 
campaign. In each document we coded all the arguments provided by or reported for 
each one of the relevant actors (organizations or their individual representatives) in 
great detail and then summarized them in a limited number of abstract categories 
(frames), which we created on the basis of our reading of the controversy.2 For each 
side, the main frames are defined on the basis of the relative frequency in the media 
input. The camp that uses a given frame most frequently is said to own the frame.
Let us illustrate the coding of the substantive frames with an example: the “mass 
naturalization frame.” We coded the following pro arguments (in favor of the propo-
sition): “mass naturalization has to be stopped,” “there are too many foreigners in 
Switzerland,” and “we should avoid naturalization of criminals or welfare recipi-
ents.” The contra arguments against the proposition included “the share of immi-
grants among the Swiss population is not excessively large” and “the number of 
naturalizations is not excessive.” We summarized these (and other) related arguments 
in a single frame, the mass naturalization frame. Since the pro camp used the mass 
          
   
naturalization frame more often in the media input than the contra camp, it is said to 
have owned this frame. The pro arguments of the mass naturalization frame are the 
offensive arguments, whereas the contra arguments of this frame correspond to the 
defensive arguments.
Overall, almost 8,000 arguments were coded by eight different coders. Cohen’s κ 
for intercoder reliability at the single argument level was .61, which is not high, but 
acceptable. We consider it acceptable because one of us carefully checked all the argu-
ments after the coding and corrected for coding errors and because, for the analysis, 
we summarized the detailed codes for arguments to broader categories (frames), which 
are less error prone (Cohen’s κ = .87).
Campaign Dialogue
We rely on the formula developed by Sigelman and Buell (2004) to calculate the level 
of campaign dialogue:
  100 – (∑│P
pf
 – P
cf
│/ 2)
P
pf
 and P
cf
 are the percentages of total emphasis that the pro and contra camp put on 
a certain frame, f, respectively. This measure is derived from the total of the absolute 
differences between the two camps in the share of attention each camp devotes to a 
certain frame. For example, assume that there were three frames for the two camps to 
address and that the sides distributed their attention as follows:
Frame 1 Frame 2 Frame 3
Pro camp 100%   0% 0%
Contra camp   0% 100% 0%
In this example, the pro camp concentrated exclusively on one frame, the contra 
camp focused exclusively on a different frame, and both sides ignored the third frame. 
Obviously, no campaign dialogue occurred during this campaign. Summing up the 
absolute differences between the camps would produce a difference of 200—that is, 
|100 – 0| + |0 – 100| + |0 – 0| = 200. The result corresponds to 200 rather than to 100 
because of double counts. We need to divide the sum by 2 to calibrate the measure to 
the range between 0 and 100. In addition, subtracting from 100 converts the measure 
to one of similarity rather than dissimilarity. Thus, the closer the resulting measure is 
to 100, the more campaign dialogue we have. A score of, say, 40 for a campaign would 
indicate a 40% overlap in the two sides’ attention profiles.
          
     
Political Actor Types
In direct-democratic campaigns, different actor types are involved. We distinguish 
among political parties, economic interest groups and unions, citizens’ interest groups, 
church organizations and social movement organizations (SMOs), the authorities 
consisting of the minister in charge of the campaign issue and the public administra-
tion, and finally ad hoc campaign committees.
Extremity
Based on a block-model analysis by Bernhard (2010), we define extreme and moder-
ate actors. Block-model analysis allows for distinguishing between structurally 
equivalent groups of actors on the basis of an analysis of the cooperative relationships. 
A block model consists of two elements (Wasserman & Faust, 1999, p. 395): (a) a 
partition of actors in the network into discrete subsets called positions and (b) for each 
pair of positions, a statement of the presence or absence of a tie within or between the 
positions. The CONCOR algorithm was used, which applies successive splits to the 
network. In the naturalization initiative, there was only one block in the center. The 
more extreme blocks (the left and the populist right) are labeled extreme left- and 
right-wing blocks. These extreme blocks are extreme in relative, but not necessarily 
in absolute terms: They are just more extreme than the moderate block in the center.
We use a rare event logistic regression (relogit) to investigate the factors influenc-
ing the contest frames. Relogit is used in the case of binary dependent variables, with 
dozens to thousands fewer ones (events, such as contest frames) than zeros (“non-
events,” such as substantive frames; King & Zeng, 2001).
Results
Substantive Emphasis Choice
We begin this section by identifying and describing the main frames of the campaign 
under scrutiny. The main frames of each camp are in bold. We arrive at one main 
frame for the contra camp and two main frames for the pro camp. As becomes clear 
from Table 1, the campaigners predominantly address their own frame. In the media 
input, the most important (core) frame of the contra camp makes up 49% of the argu-
ments, whereas the pro camp focused on its most important frame in 39% of cases.
To avoid arbitrary decisions, the rule of law frame asks for fair procedures that 
comply with basic human rights. By contrast, the pro side conceived naturalizations as 
political and not as administrative acts. Therefore, it is not surprising that its core 
frame is concerned with the claim that people should have the final say (people final 
say). Aside from procedural aspects, the proponents adopted a rather xenophobic dis-
course. They stated that “mass naturalizations” had to be stopped and also alluded to 
crimes that occurred during the campaign, especially to those committed by recently 
          
   
naturalized persons. Both sides used additional frames, which are summarized under 
“other” frames in Table 1.
Table 1 also allows for a comparison of the media input with the political advertise-
ments. First, a look at the total number of arguments (n total) in the two channels 
provides us with a general idea of the importance of the different channels. The figures 
indicate that the contra camp was much more active in producing arguments for media 
input. It produced more than twice as many arguments for the news media than for the 
advertisements. By contrast, the pro camp produced twice as many arguments in polit-
ical ads than in media input. This suggests that the two camps followed different 
strategies: Although the contra camp relied much more on media news reporting, the 
pro camp heavily relied on paid advertisements. The populist right-wing party (SVP) 
had the lead in the pro camp campaign and used the political advertisements channel 
more often than the media input. This is a result of the organizational structure of the 
two camps—heterogeneous and decentralized (contra) versus access to resources and 
homogenous and centralized structure (pro). The contra camp has access to more per-
sonnel, the pro camp to more money (Bernhard, 2010).
As expected, in the political advertisements, the political actors use their core frame 
more frequently. The corresponding share rises above 50%. This result shows that the 
political actors, indeed, focus more on their core frame in their advertisements. 
Nevertheless, they use other frames as well in their ads—their own second main frame 
or their rival’s frame. Figure 1 provides typical examples of advertisements that the 
two sides used during the campaign. These illustrations show that the camps generally 
focus on one message in advertisements.
Table 1. The Main Substantive Frames of the Two Camps, by Communication Channel: 
Percentages
Contra Pro
 Media input (%) Political ads (%) Media input (%) Political ads (%)
Substantive frames  
 Rule of law 49.0 52.3 19.6 14.4
 People final say 21.9 28.4 39.3 23.6
 Mass 
naturalization
17.5 0.0 20.6 58.1
 Other and 
nonframes
5.0 14.7 7.5 3.9
All substantive 93.5 95.4 86.9 100.0
Contest frames 6.5 4.6 13.1 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 675 109 107 1358
          
     
For the contra camp, the core frame of the media input also remains the core frame 
of the political advertisement. By contrast, the core frame of the pro camp in the media 
input, the people final say frame, is used in only 23.6% of all frames in ads. Instead, 
the mass naturalization frame makes up 58% of all frames in ads. This result points to 
a change in the strategy of the pro camp. The campaigner responsible for this strategic 
change explained in an interview: Toward the end of the campaign, the pro camp 
changed its strategy because the campaigners received feedback from their activists 
indicating that the people final say frame was not convincing. In addition, the pro 
camp had more funds available than was originally planned. This allowed it to publish 
a significant number of political advertisements in the last 3 weeks of the campaign. 
The pro camp tested different arguments and decided to promote primarily the mass 
naturalization frame. As a result, we see the mass naturalization frame emphasized in 
their advertisements. The pro camp reused its well-known advertisement from the 
2004 naturalization of second and third generation immigrants campaign (Figure 1a). 
Because the end of the campaign was nearing, the pro camp was unable to change its 
core frame in the other channels, too.
Usually (see Hänggli, 2010), campaigners do not change their substantive emphasis 
choice during a campaign. The strategic actors rather stay on frame. The main frames 
are promoted from the very beginning, and no new frame appears in the course of the 
campaign. In addition, the most important frame of a camp remains the most important 
over time in both channels. The behavior of the pro camp in the naturalization cam-
paign represents an exception to this general behavior.
Figure 2 presents the development of the total number of frames in the course of the 
campaign. It presents the weekly development of the frames in the media input and the 
political advertisements of the two camps. The panels show that the contra camp 
launched its media input at well-chosen moments (two peaks), whereas the pro camp’s 
Figure 1. Political advertisements of the two campsa. Advertisement of the populist right in 
support of its initiativeb. Advertisement of the moderate right’s contra campaign
          


   
the pro camp. This might be the result of the fact that a former member of the Federal 
Council from the populist right-wing party (SVP), Christoph Blocher, was not reelected 
and was instead replaced by another person from the same party, Eveline Widmer-
Schlumpf, on December 12, 2007. After Ms. Widmer-Schlumpf had accepted the elec-
tion, she was thrown out of the SVP, and a small minority of supporters of 
Widmer-Schlumpf split off from the party. The issue was highly contentious and emo-
tional, and the naturalization initiative was the first vote for which Widmer-Schlumpf 
was the responsible federal councilor. Moreover, as the federal councilor responsible for 
defending the government’s position, she was forced to take a stand against her former 
party. Table 3 provides more details for this particular aspect and shows the use the 
contest frames by the different actor types. It can be seen that the authorities and the 
political parties of the pro camp mainly campaigned with significantly more conflict 
frames. In fact, it appears that the dispute between Christoph Blocher, the SVP, and 
Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf caused the quarrelling actors to rely more on conflict frames. 
Blocher and the SVP belonged to the political parties of the pro camp, and Widmer-
Schlumpf to the authorities.
Since the campaign took place soon after the non-reelection of Blocher, it is 
likely that the actors involved used more contest frame than would otherwise have 
been the case. However, even in this particular case, framing is still primarily 
accomplished in substantive terms. In Table 4, it becomes evident that the political 
actors of the more extreme blocks use more contest frames than the political actors 
of the moderate block. This effect is significant at the p = .001 level. As control 
variables, we also examine whether the right-wing political actors or the govern-
mental camp use more contest frames. This is not the case in this campaign. Before 
discussing the influence of time on contest frames, we discuss variation in different 
communication channels.
Returning again at Table 1, we see that, in the ads, the political actors also generally 
refrain from using contest frames. Compared to the media input, they are used less 
Table 3. Contest Frames: Percentage Shares by Camp and Actor Type
Camp
Contra Pro
Actor type
Authorities 
(%)
Parties 
(%)
Economic 
interest 
groups (%)
Citizens’ 
interest 
groups (%)
Parties 
(%)
Ad hoc 
committees 
(%)
Personal 
attacks
1.7 2.0 9.2 6.6 7.4 0.0
Conflicts 5.6 2.0 4.1 0.5 7.4 0.0
All contest 
frames
7.2 4.1 13.3 7.1 14.7 0.0
n 180 246 98 198 95 21
          
     
often in the political advertisements. However, we can state that in direct-democratic 
campaigns, framing is done primarily in substantive terms in both channels.
Table 4 also shows the influence of time on the share of contest frames in the media 
input. Time is measured in terms of campaign weeks. This variable turns out to be 
insignificant, which means that, in the media input, the campaigners do not change their 
contest emphasis choice over time by increasing the use of contest frames. This might be 
different in other campaigns (Hänggli 2010). With regard to the use of contest frames 
over time in the political ads, we can state that there is no variation over time.
Conclusion
We can summarize the results according to the three strategic choices of framing that 
we have outlined in this article. With regard to the substantive emphasis and the oppo-
sitional emphasis choices, we find that political actors tend to emphasize their own 
frames, but they do not exclusively do so. In addition, they also address the frames 
owned by their opponents (also see Gerth & Siegert, 2012).
With regard to variation of the substantive emphasis choice in the communication 
channels, we find that political actors generally focus on their core frame in the polit-
ical advertisements. In the media input, the core frame of the contra camp makes up 
49% of the arguments, whereas the pro camp focuses on its most important frame in 
39% of the cases. In the political advertisements, the core frame amounts to around 
half of the frames used. Exceptionally, the pro camp emphasized its second main 
frame (“mass naturalization”) more than its core frame (“people final say”) in the 
advertisements. Although the political actors of the contra camp stayed on their core 
frame, the pro camp switched from the people final say frame to the mass naturaliza-
tion frame in their ads toward the end of the campaign. The people final say frame 
was not convincing. In general, however, the core frame in the media input remains 
the core frame in the advertisements, which shows that the frames used in the media 
Table 4. Rare Event Logistic Regression of Time and Other Influencing Factors on Contest 
Frames in Media Input
Coeff. Robust SE
Extreme 1.631 0.528**
Time −0.001 0.000
left-right (Li-re) 0.197 0.160
Governmental camp 1.043 0.953
Constant −5.311 1.777**
N = 782. Rare event logistic regression was used because contest frames occur only rarely (4.6%–7.6% of 
the observations are contest frames; the rest are substantive frames). Relogit provides neither pseudo R2 
nor ratios.
**p < .01.
          
   
input are not used simply to placate journalists but are representative of the intentions 
of the actors.
In the oppositional emphasis choice, the political actors determine how much 
attention to devote to their opponents’ substantive frame(s) as compared to their 
own frames. With regard to the different communication channels, we find that the 
political actors pay more attention to their opponents’ frames in the media input than 
in the ads because the mediation motivates the political actors to enter into cam-
paign dialogue with each other. In political advertisements, we find less campaign 
dialogue, that is, the quality of the debate is lower in the advertisements than in the 
other communication channels. Political advertisements have primary functions 
other than to provide dialogue. They should mobilize citizens to vote or increase 
public debate.
With regard to variation over time, we can state that campaign dialogue does not 
disappear over the course of the campaign. In the media input, even though cam-
paigners slightly decrease the use of the opponents’ frames toward the end, cam-
paign dialogue remains quite high until campaigners stop promoting their message. 
In the news media, campaign dialogue increases and remains high over several 
weeks.
With regard to the third choice, the contest emphasis choice, we have shown that 
the political actors mainly focus on substance in direct-democratic campaigns in their 
media input, that is, they mainly rely on substantive framing. We found that actors 
with more extreme positions use more contest frames and that the dispute among 
Christoph Blocher, the SVP, and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf caused the quarrelling 
political actors to rely significantly more on contest frames in the naturalization cam-
paign. Concerning the contest emphasis choice in the different communication chan-
nels, we show that in direct-democratic campaigns, the political actors often refrain 
from using contest frames in their ads and in media input. Toward the end of the cam-
paign, we do not find more contest frames in both channels.
What do these results mean for the quality of the debate in direct-democratic cam-
paigns? There are two reasons to be optimistic. First, political actors address their 
opponents’ frames. Campaign dialogue in the direct-democratic campaign (69.3) is 
much higher than the average (44.1) found in the study by Kaplan et al. (2006) of 
American candidate television advertising aired in U.S. Senate campaigns from 1998 
to 2002. In contrast, it is lower than the mean (75.3) of dialogue in U.S. presidential 
campaigns from 1960 to 2000. However, the campaign reaches a level that is almost 
as high as that seen in U.S. presidential campaigns. Thus, we conclude that there is a 
quite high level of campaign dialogue in the press releases in Swiss direct-democratic 
campaigns. Second, in media input and in advertisements, framing is primarily done 
in substantive terms.
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Notes
1. De Vreese (2005) and Matthes (2009) make a distinction between “issue-specific” and 
“generic” frames. This mixes up thematic and contest frames in both the generic and the 
issue-specific category. In addition, Chong and Druckman (2007b, p. 107) find it difficult to 
specify a frame as generic or general. We agree. However, we do not follow these authors 
when they suggest calling “script” a “feature in the communication such as a conflict” (p. 
107). Finally, Entman (2004, pp. 5-6) explores two classes of frames, substantive and proce-
dural frames. My distinction is similar, also in terms of the meaning.
2. The codebook is available from the authors on request.
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